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This paper provides comprehensive evidence on the effects of cyber-attacks (cyber-crime, cyber 
espionage, cyber warfare and hacktivism) and cyber security on the risk-adjusted returns, 
realised volatilities and trading volumes of the three main cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum 
and Litecoin). We find that stronger cyber security is generally effective in increasing the risk-
adjusted returns of cryptocurrencies and trading activity even in the presence of cyber-attacks. 
Hacktivism appears to be the most significant threat to cryptocurrency investors. Further, cyber-
attackers hitting the cryptocurrency exchanges are most likely to attack other sectors 
(government, industry and finance) as well. In addition, in the case of the US they target the 
government and industry sectors in preference to the cryptocurrency exchanges given the 
corresponding potential benefits and costs. In all cases appropriate strategies should be designed 
to enhance cyber security. 
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Despite their rather recent introduction, cryptocurrencies have very rapidly become a widely 
used type of currency and also a favourite target for cyber criminals, hackers and fraudsters. The 
main reason is their vulnerability, which is a direct consequence of their anonymity resulting 
from highly encrypted blockchain technology, where blockchain is essentially “a decentralized 
network of synchronized online registries that track the ownership and value of each token” (see 
Matthews, 2017). This implies that the security of cryptocurrencies depends entirely on the 
blockchain algorithm being used. Since all transactions are recorded, they can be tracked down; 
however, they can be made anonymous by means of a so-called “tumbler” which exchanges the 
tokens. Further, there is no central authority responsible for cryptocurrencies.  
An important issue in this context is the possible occurrence of a cyber-attack, which can be 
defined as an attack from one or more computers against other computers or networks aiming at 
disabling and/or managing the latter and obtaining access to information, thereby compromising its 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. This breach of security represents a form of cyber risk which 
has been found to be significant in the case of the financial sector (see Kopp et al., 2017). Such cyber 
threat can be detrimental to cryptocurrencies which are not regarded as similar to other standard assets 
and for which empirical evidence is limited (Liu and Tsyvinski, 2018). 
The present study provides comprehensive evidence on the effects of cyber-attacks (using 
data collected from Hackmageddon, http://www.hackmageddon.com) and cyber security on the 
risk-adjusted returns, realised volatilities and trading volumes of the three main cryptocurrencies 
(Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin). More specifically, it investigates the effects of four different 
types of cyber-attacks (cyber-crime, cyber-espionage, hacktivism and cyber-warfare) on 
cryptocurrencies, four target sectors (cryptocurrency exchange, government, industry and 
finance), and 113 countries. Furthermore, it aims to investigate whether cyber-security attenuates 
those effects. Risk-adjusted returns (the return-to-risk ratio) are constructed using realised returns 
and weighted realised covariances as the return and risk components, respectively; this measure 
considers the systemic risk (correlation) and change in market capitalisations among 
cryptocurrencies in addition to each currency’s own risk, which could all be affected by cyber-
attacks. We estimate pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions at the daily frequency over 
the period from 12 August 2015 to 28 February 2019; the model also includes appropriate 
control variables, namely stock market liquidity and financial market uncertainty. Further 
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regressions are run to identify the factors making specific sectors (cryptocurrency exchange, 
government, industry and finance) more prone to cyber-attacks and how they relate to 
cryptocurrencies and cyber security. 
We find that cyber security is generally helpful for cryptocurrency investors in the 
presence of cyber-attacks since in most cases it increases their risk-adjusted returns and boosts 
their confidence and trading activities. Hacktivism represents the main threat for investors, 
cyber-attacks targeting cryptocurrency exchanges being the most likely to hit other sectors of the 
economy (i.e., government, industry and finance) as well. In the case of the US, government and 
industry sectors are less likely to be hit because of the high level of cyber security. This should 
be enhanced also in other sectors to provide a safer digital trading environment for 
(cryptocurrency) investors (van Hardeveld et al., 2017). 
Our study contributes to the finance literature focusing on Fintech, which is still very 
limited despite widespread interest across the globe (Chen et al., 2019; Goldstein et al., 2019). 
Fintech includes seven categories: cybersecurity, mobile transactions, data analytics, blockchain, 
peer-to-peer (P2P), robo-advising and internet of things (IoT) (Chen et al., 2019).1 Our analysis 
adds to the understanding of Fintech in its blockchain and cybersecurity aspects and extends the 
empirical asset pricing literature on cryptocurrencies. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Digital currencies, commonly known as cryptocurrencies, have established themselves in recent 
years both as an alternative to fiat money (see Yermack, 2018) and as a tradable asset used for 
risk-hedging purposes (see Bouri et al., 2017a, 2017c). Given their increasing importance, a 
number of studies have been carried out to analyse the main features of these newly created 
markets, including returns and risk (e.g., Balciar et al., 2017; Liu and Tsyvinski, 2018; Caporale 
and Zekokh, 2019), market efficiency (e.g., Urquhart, 2016; Bariviera, 2017; Nadarajah and Chu, 
 
1 Chen et al. (2019) define the peer-to-peer (P2P), robo-advising and Internet of things (IoT) as follows. Peer-to-peer 
(P2P): Software, systems, or platforms that facilitate consumer-to-consumer financial transactions. Robo-advising: 
Computer systems or programs that provide automated investment advice to customers or portfolio managers. 




2017) and anomalies (Caporale et al., 2018; Caporale and Plastun, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c), illegal 
activities (Foley et al., 2018, Li et al., 2018; Gandal et al., 2018;  Griffin and Shams, 2018), 
hedging properties (e.g., Dyhrberg 2016a, 2016b; Baur et al., 2018; Bouri et al., 2017a, 2017b, 
2017c), initial coin offerings (ICO) (Kostovetsky and Benedetti. 2018; Howell et al., 2018; Lee 
et al., 2018; Li and Mann, 2018; Malinova and Park, 2017; An et al., 2020), the effects of cyber-
attacks (Caporale et al., 2019; An et al., 2020; Shanaev et al., 2020), and the economic 
implications of the emergence of this new type of asset (e.g., Böhme et al., 2015; Dwyer, 2015; 
Harvey, 2016; Raskin and Yermack 2016; Bariviera et al., 2017; Biais et al., 2018; Schilling and 
Uhlig 2018). 
The impact of cyber-crime on cryptocurrency markets and the economy as a whole has 
been analysed in various recent papers. For instance, Benjamin et al. (2019) estimated that cyber-
attacks from criminals operating in underground web communities such as Darknet have resulted 
in estimated annual losses of $445 billion for the global markets (see Graham, 2017). In another 
interesting study, Bouveret (2018) used a Value-at-Risk (VaR) framework to measure cyber risk 
and the resulting losses in a number of countries.  
In the case of cryptocurrencies, given their distinctive features (see Corbet et al., 2019a) 
different methods are required to estimate and manage risk (see Platanakis and Urquhart, 2019). 
Cyber-attacks are considered a very important risk factor by both small and large “miners”, 
whose task is to group unconfirmed transactions into new blocks and add them to the global 
ledger known as the “blockchain” (see Hileman and Rauchs, 2017). Benjamin et al. (2019) 
provided some evidence on the disruptions caused by cyber security breaches in the case of the 
cryptocurrency markets; these have also been targeted for the purpose of illicit online drug 
trading (see Martin, 2014), which has given rise to a number of ethical issues (see Martin and 
Christin, 2016). Shanaev et al. (2020) warned that if any individual or group of coin miners 
controls over 50% of the network mining, they can take over the chain, especially in the case of 
cryptocurrencies with small proof-of-work and low hash rates. 
Caporale et al. (2019) used a Markov-switching non-linear specification to analyse the 
effects of cyber-attacks on returns in the case of four cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, 
Litecoin and Stellar) over the period between 8 August 2015 and 28 February 2019. They found 
significant negative effects on the probability of cryptocurrencies staying in the low volatility 
regime. Corbet et al. (2019b) estimated a DCC-GARCH model and documented that 
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cryptocurrency hacks increase both the volatility of the currencies hacked and their correlations 
with other cryptocurrencies; further, they decrease price discovery for the hacked currencies in 
comparison to others. As for the effects on returns, abnormal ones are observed preceding the 
hack, which revert to zero when this is publicly announced. However, this research is limited to 
17 hacking events on the cryptocurrency exchanges within less than a year.  
Developing strategies to deal with and possibly prevent cyber-crime has therefore 
become very important (see van Hardeveld et al., 2017). In the case of the US, a specific concern 
has been the use of cryptocurrencies to avoid sanctions. It has been suggested that a task force 
including agencies from the Departments of the Treasury, State, Justice and Defence should be 
created to focus in particular on the cracking of blockchain cryptography to trace transactions 
(see Konowicz, 2018).  
None of the above studies considers a wide range of cyber-attacks in different categories 
and their effects on the risk-adjusted returns and trading volumes of cryptocurrencies and various 
sectors in the presence of cyber security. The analysis below addresses all these issues using an 
appropriate empirical framework which yields informative new findings about the effectiveness 
of cyber security. and differences in the trading behaviour of Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin 
investors when cyber-attacks occur. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Cryptocurrency data 
We collect daily data on the closing prices and trading volumes for the three main 
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin) over the period between 12 August 2015 and 
28 February 2019 from the website www.CryptoDataDownload.com; this provides historical 
data for traded prices using the Application Programming Interface (API) service and is a 
reliable cryptocurrency data source as pointed out by Alexander and Dakos (2020). We choose 
five main exchanges (Bitfinex, Coinbase, Gemini, Kraken and Poloniex) that are common to the 
three cryptocurrencies under examination.2 We then compute market capital-weighted indices 
 
2 The www.CryptoDataDownload.com website does not provide all the cryptocurrency exchanges for each country. 
Thus, we select from this source data for five major exchanges (the same as in Alexander and Dakos (2020)) in the 
US and the UK that are common to the three cryptocurrencies being examined (Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin) and 
were available at the time when they were collected. 
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which are based on the five exchanges. The natural log returns are used for the estimation of the 
models. We show these in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
 We use the cryptocurrency return and volume data to compute the return-to-risk ratio; it 
is essential to use risk-adjusted returns in the case of cryptocurrencies since they are more 
volatile than standard assets such as stocks and derivatives. As a risk measure, we consider the 
correlation (i.e., the systemic risk for cryptocurrencies) and change in the trading volumes of 
cryptocurrencies in addition to each cryptocurrency’s own risk (i.e., volatility), which could all 
be affected by cyber-attacks. Therefore, we compute the risk-adjusted returns of cryptocurrencies 
as follows:  
                                                                 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
�𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 × 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡′
                                                           (1) 
where the components are estimated as below: 
 












)                                                    (2) 
 
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 × 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡′                                                                                                                                            (3) 




















∑ (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)3𝑖𝑖=1
𝑃𝑃2,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑉𝑉2,𝑡𝑡
∑ (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)3𝑖𝑖=1
𝑃𝑃3,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑉𝑉3,𝑡𝑡
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𝑃𝑃2,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑉𝑉2,𝑡𝑡
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𝑃𝑃3,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑉𝑉3,𝑡𝑡
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𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the realised return, namely the time-varying drift coefficient of the stochastic differential 
equation we assume cryptocurrency i to follow at time t – this is the return component. 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the 
price of cryptocurrency i at time t, 𝑉𝑉1,𝑡𝑡 is its trading volume of cryptocurrency i at time t, and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(= 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡×𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∑ (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡×𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1
) its market capitalization ( 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) weight across N different types of 
cryptocurrencies (where i=1, ⋯, N) at time t. N is equal to three in our case since our sample 
includes three cryptocurrencies, namely Bitcoin (i = 1), Ethereum (i = 2) and Litecoin (i = 3). 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 
is a (1 × N) vector whose elements are the volume weights 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 of all three cryptocurrencies at 
time t. 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡′ is a transpose of the vector 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡. 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the realised covariance between cryptocurrencies 
i and j at time t. 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  is the realised covariance at time t using all three cryptocurrencies’ 
realised covariance 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 in a (N × N) matrix form. The resulting �𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 × 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡′ is used as the 
risk component. 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is the risk-adjusted return of cryptocurrency i at time t. We denote 
�𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 × 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡′ as √Rcov
w  , and 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵, 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 and 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 as Bit_RAR, Eth_RAR and 
Lit_RAR, respectively, throughout the paper. 
 
3.2. Cyber-attack data 
The recent developments in technology of networking and cyberspace, including 
cryptocurrencies using blockchain technology, have been highly beneficial. However, the rapid 
growth in these fields have also promoted unethical practices using these technologies to exploit 
others, which include cyber-attacks (Uma and Padmavathi, 2013). These are an attempt to 
damage, destroy or gain illegal access to a computer network or system (Bodford and Kwan, 
2018). 
The cyber-attack data are taken from the website http://www.hackmageddon.com/ which 
shows the cyber-attack timeline by target industry, country and cyber-attack type at a daily 
frequency. The Hackmageddon’s cyber-attacks are collected from public sources such as blogs 
and news sites. Therefore, the sample collection cannot be complete, but it aims to provide a 
wide overview of the cyber-attack threat landscape across the globe (Passeri, 2020). We have 
collected data on 4006 daily cyber-attacks (including daily overlaps) from 12 August 2015 to 28 
February 2019 for four target sectors, namely the government (Gov), industry (Ind), finance (Fin) 
and cryptocurrency exchange (Crypto) sectors, and created in each case binary variables equal to 
1 for the sector affected and 0 for the others. Thus there are four cyber-attack binary variables, 
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namely cyber-crime (CC), cyber espionage (CE), hacktivism (H) and cyber warfare (CW), each 
being equal to 1 if the corresponding type of attack occurs and 0 otherwise. However, CW is 
dropped from the model to avoid the dummy variable trap. Since multiple cyber attacks may 
occur within a day, we use the added-up binary figures of these per day which shows the daily 
intensity in terms of cyber-attack target and type merging into 1157 daily cyber-attacks without 
daily overlaps in total. 
According to Uma and Padmavathi (2013), cyber-crime can be defined as a criminal 
offence which involves a computer either as an object or a tool to commit a material component 
of the offence; cyber espionage is the cracking technique and malicious software (e.g., Trojan 
horses and spy ware) used to obtain information without the permission of the holder from 
individuals, groups and governments for gaining benefits through illegal abuse methods; cyber 
warfare is the use of computer technology to penetrate a nation’s computer network in order to 
cause damage or disruption. Hacktivism is instead “the act of gaining access to (and control over) 
third-party computer systems” (Bodford and Kwan, 2018). 
Figure 2 and 3 show, respectively, the cyber-attack targets and types considered in the 
analysis. It is apparent from Figure 2 that the industry sector (54.5%) is the most frequent target 
of cyber-attacks, which suggests that it is more vulnerable, compared to other sectors (e.g., 
government, financial and cryptocurrency exchange) that have stronger cyber security 
protections. In particular, the cryptocurrency exchanges appear to be the least targeted, 
presumably because their blockchain technology works effectively against cyber-attacks and this 
being a new sector hackers need time to learn how to attack it successfully.  
Figure 3 shows that cyber-crime (77.6%) is the most frequent type of cyber-attack, and 
cyber warfare (3.2%) the least frequent; this is not surprising, since the latter is an attack on a 
nation’s computer network and thus on a larger scale relative to other types of cyber-attacks. 
North America (United States and Canada), the UK and India have been the most frequently 
targeted by cyber-attacks of the 113 countries considered (Appendix II and III).3 There were also 
930 cyber-attacks targeting more than one country, which is the second most frequent case (see 
Appendix II); this is plausible since by their nature cyber-attacks are world-wide events without 
geographical restrictions. 
 
3 In Appendix II ‘More than one country’ and ‘Unknown’ country sources are dropped since they cannot be 





[Insert Figure 2] 
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
3.3. Cyber security 
As our cyber security measure we use the daily ISE (International Securities Exchange) Cyber 
Security Index from the Nasdaq Global Indexes available on the Bloomberg platform. The index 
started on 31 December 2010 with a base value of 100.00 and includes companies actively 
involved in providing cyber security technology and services. These must be a direct 
hardware/software developer or a service provider of cyber security with a minimum free float 
market capitalisation of $100 million and three-month average daily dollar trading volume of $1 
million, and also to be listed on an eligible exchange as of the reference dates (i.e., at the end of 
January, April, July and October each year) with securities seasoned at least three calendar 
months. Therefore, the index provides a benchmark for companies developing hardware and/or 
software which protects access to files, websites and networks, both locally and from external 
origins, or companies that use these tools to provide consulting and/or cyber security services to 
their clients (Nasdaq Global Indexes, 2020). 
 
3.4. Control variables 
We use the daily liquidity (Liq) and change in global financial market uncertainty index (∆VIX) 
as our financial market control variables. Liq is a percent-cost liquidity proxy which is based on 
daily data measured using the following FHT (Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka) method developed 
by Fong et al. (2017): 
                                                          𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ≡ 𝑆𝑆 ≡ 2𝜎𝜎𝑁𝑁−1(
1 + 𝑧𝑧
2
)                                                            (5) 
where 
                                                              𝑧𝑧 ≡ 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 ≡
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝐹𝐹𝑍𝑍 + 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑍𝑍
                                                           (6) 
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                                                                  𝑁𝑁 �
𝑆𝑆
2𝜎𝜎
� −  𝑁𝑁 �
−𝑆𝑆
2𝜎𝜎
� = 𝑧𝑧                                                              (7) 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 is the number of zero return days, 𝐹𝐹𝑍𝑍 is the number of trading days and 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑍𝑍 is the number 
of no-trade days in a given month. Further, 𝑆𝑆 is the percentage transaction cost, 𝑁𝑁−1() is the 
inverse of the cumulative normal distribution function and σ is the standard deviation of the daily 
stock return over a month. Thus, Liq is the percent transaction cost S which is an increasing 
function of zero returns and the volatility of the return distribution (equation 5) based on the 
theoretical probability of a zero return being in the middle region of returns assumed to be 
normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2 (equation 7) (Fong et al., 2017). The stock 
prices for our sample countries are collected from Bloomberg in daily frequency. VIX is the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index also collected from Bloomberg. We 
use the daily percentage change (∆) of this index as our global financial market uncertainty 
control variable. 
 
3.5. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the series being analysed, namely cyber-attack target and 
types (Panel A), the financial market control variables (liquidity (Liq) and the change in global 
financial market uncertainty (∆VIX) in Panel B), the cyber security index (Cyber_Sec in Panel B), 
and the logs of returns (R), realised return (Mu), realized volatility (RV), weighted realised 
covariance (Rcovw), natural logarithm of trading volume (V) and risk-adjusted return (RAR) of 
the three cryptocurrencies under investigation (Bitcoin (Panel C), Ethereum (Panel D) and 
Litecoin (Panel E)) in daily frequencies. In panel F, we show the 96 stock indices used to obtain 
our country-specific liquidity variables for which we calculate the daily average if they belong to 
the same cyber-attack incident hitting multiple countries at once. The control variables (Liq and 
∆VIX) are lagged by one year to avoid hindsight bias. We winsorise all variables at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. 
In most cases the distributions of cyber-attacks target and type data are positively skewed; 
the exception is cyber-crime (CC), which is negatively skewed. In other words, cyber-crime 
tends to occur very frequently on average relative to other types of cyber-attacks (CE, CW and H) 
or those targeting certain sectors (Gov, Ind, Fin and Crypto) or countries (US). We also find that 
in our sample liquidity, global financial market uncertainty (∆VIX) and cyber security are 
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positively skewed. Liq is a unit-less, non-negative measure (Fong et al., 2017), most of its 
summary statistics having an absolute value much smaller than 1%, unlike the dependent 
variables which instead exceed 1% in most cases. Therefore, we use the scaled Liq measure 
multiplied by 100. On the other hand, the Cyber_Sec measure is a relatively large, non-negative 
three-digit global index which we scale by dividing by 100. Finally, ∆VIX is the daily percentage 
change in the VIX index which can be either positive or negative, with many absolute values 
larger than 1%, and it is not scaled. 
We drop from the sample two cyber-attacks that targeted Belarus and Nepal since these 
two countries do not have an appropriate stock market index to calculate liquidity as above. Thus, 
we consider 96 countries market indices (Panel F) out of a total of 113 (Appendix II) with 
overlapping or non-existing stock indices to calculate country-specific liquidity. We find that 
Bitcoin exhibits the largest trading volume (Bit_V) and risk-adjusted returns (Bit_RAR) and 
Litecoin the lowest (Lit_V and Lit_RAR). The composite risks for the three cryptocurrencies 
under investigation, measured by the square root of weighted realised covariance (√Rcovw), are 
generally high, which results in a negatively skewed distribution.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3.6. Cyber-attack effects associated with cryptocurrencies and cyber security 
We analyse the effect of cyber-attacks on the risk-adjusted returns (RARt), realised volatility (RVt) 
and trading volume (Vt) of cryptocurrencies and their relationship with cyber security 
(Cyber_Sect). In particular, we analyse how cryptocurrencies are affected by cyber-attack targets 
(i.e., cryptocurrency exchange (Cyberi,t), government (Govi,t), industry (Indi,t) and finance (Fini,t) 
sectors, and US versus non-US countries (USt)), types (i.e., cyber-crime (CCi,t), cyber-espionage 
(CEi,t), cyber-warfare (CWi,t) and hacktivism (Hi,t)) and cyber security (Cyber_Sect) while 
controlling for the change in global financial market uncertainty (∆VIXt) and stock market 
liquidity (Liqi,t) in country i at day t allowing multiple cyber-attacks to occur on a single day. 
∆VIXt represent the global financial uncertainty control variables and Liqi,t is the country-specific 
financial market control variable which we use the average value if there are multiple countries 
involved at day t. The cyber-attack target and types are binary variables equal to one if the cyber-
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attack matches a given type or target and zero otherwise.4 Our dataset includes multiple cyber-
attack incidents within a single day. Therefore, we add up each of these binary variables within 
each day to obtain daily values which represent cyber-attack intensity measures without date 
overlaps. We estimate the following pooled OLS regressions, where the ui,t is the error term and 
X denotes in turn each of the three cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin (Bit), Ethereum (Eth) and Litecoin 
(Lit): 
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Cryptoi,t, Govi,t, Indi,t and Fini,t) a more frequent target for cyber-attacks: 
𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐺𝐺𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝐺𝐺𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽4�𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5�𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8(𝑋𝑋_𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝛽9(𝑋𝑋_𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽10�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽11�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
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4 CWt is not included to avoid the dummy variable trap. 
13 
 
𝐺𝐺𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽4�𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5�𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8(𝑋𝑋_𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝛽9(𝑋𝑋_𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽10�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽11�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽13(𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)+ 𝛽𝛽14�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽15�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽16(∆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                               (12) 
𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽4�𝐺𝐺𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5�𝐺𝐺𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽6�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽7�𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8(𝑋𝑋_𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝛽9(𝑋𝑋_𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽10�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽11�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽13(𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)+ 𝛽𝛽14�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽15�𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽16(∆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                               (13) 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽3�𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽4�𝐺𝐺𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5�𝐺𝐺𝑍𝑍𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽6�𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽7�𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽8(𝑋𝑋_𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡)
+ 𝛽𝛽9(𝑋𝑋_𝑍𝑍𝑅𝑅𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑍𝑍𝑟𝑟_𝑆𝑆𝑍𝑍𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽10�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�+ 𝛽𝛽11�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽12�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�




4. Empirical Results 
Our aim is to analyse the effects of cyber-attacks on the risk-adjusted returns, realised volatility 
and trading volumes of three main cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin) accounting 
for the cyber security level while controlling for the underlying country-specific stock market 
liquidity and global uncertainty measure. We control for country and month (i.e., seasonality) 
effects in our analysis - in some countries, for instance, cyber-attacks may be likely to hit certain 
sectors (e.g., government5 or financial institution6) more than other countries at different times. 
Furthermore, cyber-attacks may occur more frequently during holidays 7, tax 8 or presidential 
 
5 See Specops on 13 July 2020 available at https://specopssoft.com/blog/countries-experiencing-significant-cyber-
attacks/  (accessed on 12 January 2021). 
6 Baur-Yazbeck, S. (2018), 4 Cyber Attacks that Threaten Financial Inclusion, CGAP, available at  
https://www.cgap.org/blog/4-cyber-attacks-threaten-financial-inclusion (accessed on 12 January 2021). 
7 See Surveillance and Security on 25 November 2014 available at  
https://www.retailtechnologyreview.com/articles/2014/11/25/lancope-protects-retailers-from-cyber-attacks-during-
vulnerable-holiday-season/ (accessed on 12 January 2021). 
8 See TechWerxe on 27 February 2020 available at https://techwerxe.com/5-tips-to-keep-your-companys-data-safe-
during-tax-season/ (accessed on 12 January 2021). 
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election 9 periods when agents are distracted by other events and therefore more vulnerable. 
There is no multicollinearity among the regressors according to the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
test whose value is less than 10 in all cases (see Appendix I). 
 
4.1. Cyber-attack effects on the risk-adjusted returns of cryptocurrencies and cyber security 
Table 3 suggests that stronger cyber security generally results in higher risk-adjusted returns of 
the cryptocurrencies under examination when cyber-attacks target different types of sectors. In 
their presence, the effects of cyber security remain the same except for the cryptocurrency 
exchanges (Crypto × Cyber_Sec) and the government sector (Gov × Cyber_Sec), where they are 
less pronounced especially in the case of Bitcoin (Bit_RAR) and Litecoin (Lit_RAR), but are still 
present since the sum of the relevant significant coefficients (Cyber_Sec, Crypto and Gov) and 
those on the corresponding interaction terms (Crypto × Cyber_Sec and Gov × Cyber_Sec) are 
still positive. On the other hand, the Ethereum’ risk adjusted return (Eth_RAR) appears to be 
relatively immune to cyber-attacks on major sectors of the economy while cyber security still has 
a positive effect.  Hacktivism (H) proves to be the most significant type of cyber-attack reducing 
the risk-adjusted returns, especially for Bitcoins.  
Stock market liquidity (Liq) also tends to reduce the risk-adjusted returns of the 
cryptocurrencies under investigation. In a previous study, Wei (2018) showed that in the case of 
cryptocurrencies more liquidity decreases volatility as market efficiency improves. Our findings 
suggest that stock investors regard the cryptocurrency markets as a substitute for trading on the 
basis of their respective liquidities: as active cryptocurrency traders become less likely to 
arbitrage any signs of return predictabilities in less liquid cryptocurrency markets (Wei, 2018), 
the liquidity risk increases and so does volatility, leading to a decrease in the risk-adjusted 
returns of cryptocurrencies. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4.2. Cyber-attack effects on the realised volatilities of cryptocurrencies and cyber security 
 
9 Lam, C. (2018), A Slap on the Wrist: Combatting Russia’s Cyber Attack on the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, 
Boston College Law Review, 59(6), pp. 2261 – 2201.  
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Table 4 shows that, in most cases, an increase in cyber security reduces the risk of 
cryptocurrencies (measured by their realised volatilities) in the presence of cyber-attacks. 
However, this is not the case when the government sector (Gov × Cyber_Sec) is targeted, the 
realised volatility of Bitcoin (Bit_RV) not being reduced. Hacktivism is the most significant 
variable increasing risk for all three cryptocurrencies considered. This is plausible as Android 
Trojans (which run on the Android operating system such as games, system updates or utilities10) 
can make attacks from hackers more effective by identifying crypto wallet owners and giving 
access to crypto wallets. Therefore, accordingly, cryptocurrencies are likely to be the main target 
for hackers specialising in web-based attacks (Group-IB, 2017). An increase in stock market 
liquidity (Liq) may lead more investors to trade stocks rather than cryptocurrencies, as argued 
before. Further, lower liquidity in the cryptocurrency markets can make it more difficult to 
arbitrage and exit trading positions in a timely manner and therefore which the realised volatility 
of cryptocurrencies will increase.     
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
4.3. Cyber-attack effects on the trading volumes of cryptocurrencies and cyber security 
In general, cryptocurrency investors become more confident and increase their trading when 
cyber security protection increases, even in the presence of cyber-attacks (Table 5). Cyber 
security (Cyber_Sec) provides less confidence to cryptocurrency investors when cyber-attacks hit 
the cryptocurrency exchanges (Crypto × Cyber_Sec) as opposed to other sectors, and therefore 
investors become risk-averse. Again hacktivism appears to have the most significant impact on 
the behaviour of cryptocurrency investors, making them risk-averse and reducing trading, 
especially in the case of Ethereum.  Finally, an increase in Liq leads to reduced cryptocurrency 
trading, which confirms the substitution effect between stock and cryptocurrency markets on the 
basis of their respective liquidities.   
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
4.4. Cyber-attack effects on different sectors, cryptocurrencies, and cyber security 
 
10 https://www.f-secure.com/en (Accessed 6 January 2021) 
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Tables 6 to 9 show how likely each sector (Crypto, Gov, Ind and Fin) in the economy is to be 
targeted by cyber-attacks for different levels of cyber security, cyber-attack types (CC, CE, H 
and CW) and targets, country (US versus non-US), cryptocurrency risk-adjusted returns and 
control variables (Liq and ∆VIX).  
Overall, we find that cyber-attackers targeting cryptocurrency exchanges are most likely 
to divert to other sectors (i.e., Gov, Ind and Fin), as indicated by the estimated coefficients for 
Crypto. Cyber security is generally effective in reducing the likelihood of attacks only in the case 
of the industry sector, the only exception being the US, where it makes attacks to cryptocurrency 
exchanges less frequent and those to the government and industry sectors more frequent. This 
suggests that for cyber-attackers the benefits of successfully hitting the US government and 
industry sectors outweigh the costs and that the opposite holds for cryptocurrency exchanges 
(Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9). 
 The cybercriminals targeting cryptocurrency exchanges tend to be those attacking the 
financial sector (Table 6). This is plausible, as the main motivation for attacking either is likely 
to be monetary compared to other sectors which could also involve national security (Gov), 
classified information (Gov), customers profiles (Ind) and so on. Furthermore, as the risk-
adjusted returns of cryptocurrencies increase (such as Bit_RAR and Lit_RAR), cryptocurrency 
exchanges can become a more attractive target for cyber-attack even in the presence of tighter 
cyber security (Bit_RAR × Cyber_Sec and Lit_RAR × Cyber_Sec). The increase in hacktivism 
frequency itself does not significantly increase the likelihood of cyber-attacks targeting the 
cryptocurrency exchanges (Table 6), although its impact on cryptocurrencies is significant once 
they are hit (as shown in section 4.1 and 4.3).  
 
[Insert Table 6] 
[Insert Table 7] 
[Insert Table 8] 








This paper sheds new light on the effects of cyber-attacks and cyber security on three of the main 
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litecoin). It considers four different types of cyber-
attacks (cyber-crime, cyber-espionage, hacktivism and cyber-warfare) as well as four target 
sectors (cryptocurrency exchange, government, industry and finance). The cyber-attacks data are 
collected from Hackmageddon (http://www.hackmageddon.com), and risk-adjusted returns, 
realised volatilities and trading volumes of the cryptocurrencies under investigation are used for 
the analysis. The risk-adjusted returns are calculated using the realised return and weighted 
realised covariance as measures of return and risk, respectively. The factors making specific 
sectors (cryptocurrency exchange, government, industry and finance) more prone to cyber-
attacks, and their relation to cryptocurrencies and cyber security, are also investigated. 
Our findings suggest that stronger cyber security is generally effective in increasing the 
risk-adjusted returns of cryptocurrencies under examination and trading activities even in the 
presence of cyber-attacks. Hacktivism appears to be the most significant threat to cryptocurrency 
investors. Further, cyber-attackers hitting the cryptocurrency exchanges are most likely to attack 
other sectors (government, industry and finance) as well. In addition, in the case of the US they 
target the government and industry sectors in preference to the cryptocurrency exchanges given 
the corresponding potential benefits and costs. In all cases appropriate strategies should be 
designed to enhance cyber security (see, e.g., van Hardeveld et al., 2017). On the whole, the 
evidence provided in this paper represents useful information for the cryptocurrency investing 
community, cyber law enforcement agents, cyber-crime investigation units and other 
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Table 1. Data description 
Variable Description 
Gov Cyber-attacks targeting the government sector. It shows 1 if it is a cyber-attack target 
and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day. We use the added-up 
figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity. 
 
Ind Cyber-attacks targeting the industry sector. It shows 1 if it is a cyber-attack target and 
0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day. We use the added-up figures 
of these per day which also shows the daily intensity. 
 
Fin Cyber-attacks targeting the financial sector. It shows 1 if it is a cyber-attack target 
and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day. We use the added-up 
figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity. 
Crypto Cyber-attacks targeting the cryptocurrency exchange sector. It shows 1 if it is a 
cyber-attack target and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day. We 
use the added-up figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity. 
 
CC Cyber-attack type of cyber crime. It shows 1 if the attack type is cyber crime and 0 
otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day. We use the added-up figures of 
these per day which also shows the daily intensity. 
CE Cyber-attack type of cyber espionage. It shows 1 if the attack type is cyber espionage 
and 0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day. We use the added-up 
figures of these per day which also shows the daily intensity.  
 
CW Cyber-attack type of cyber warfare. It shows 1 if the attack type is cyber warfare and 
0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day. We use the added-up figures 
of these per day which also shows the daily intensity. 
 
H Cyber-attack type of hacktivism. It shows 1 if the attack type is hacktivism and 0 
otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day. We use the added-up figures of 
these per day which also shows the daily intensity. 
 
US Cyber-attack targeting the United States. It shows 1 if the cyber-attack targets US and 
0 otherwise, which may happen multiple times per day. We use the added-up figures 
of these per day which also shows the daily intensity. 
 
Bit_R Bitcoin’s log returns 
 
Eth_R Ethereum’s log returns 
 
Lit_R Litecoin’s log returns 
 
Bit_Mu Bitcoin’s realised return 
 




Lit_Mu Litecoin’s realised return 
 
Bit_RV Bitcoin’s realised volatility 
 
Eth_RV Ethereum’s realised volatility 
 
Lit_RV Litecoin’s realised volatility 
 
Bit_V Natural logarithm of Bitcoin’s volume 
 
Eth_V Natural logarithm of Ethereum’s volume 
 
Lit_V Natural logarithm of Litecoin’s volume 
 
Rcovw Weighted realised covariance computed using Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin. 
 












Cyber_Sec The ISE (International Securities Exchange) Cyber Security Index is our cyber 
security measure collected from Nasdaq Global Indexes through Bloomberg. We use 
the daily figure of this index which is comprised of companies actively involved in 
providing cyber security technology and services. 
 
Liq The liquidity measure computed using the stock index of the country hit by a cyber-
attack. We take the average liquidity across the countries hit within the same day.  
 
VIX Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index 










Table 2. Summary statistics 
The following table shows summary statistics for cyber-attack target and types (Panel A), the 
underlying liquidity, block chain’s hash rate, global financial market uncertainty and investor 
protection (Panel B), and three cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin where 
Bit, Eth and Lit denote Bitcoin (Panel C), Ethereum (Panel D) and Litecoin (Panel E), 
respectively. _R, _Mu, _RV, _V and _RAR stand for log return, realised return, realised volatility, 
natural logarithm of trading volume and risk-adjusted return for the daily cryptocurrency data in 
turn (e.g., Bit_R indicates log returns in the case of Bitcoin). √Rcovw  is the square root of 
weighted realised covariance computed using Bitcoin, Ethereum and Litecoin. The data for 
cyber-attacks, liquidity, hash rate and the five cryptocurrencies are daily and span the period 
from 12 August, 2015 to 28 February, 2019; they have been collected from 
http://www.hackmageddon.com, Bloomberg and www.CryptoDataDownload.com. The Gov 
(government sector), Ind (industry sector), Fin (financial sector), Crypto (cryptocurrency 
exchange) and US (United States) series are binary variables equal to one if the cyber-attack 
targets these sectors or country, and zero otherwise. The CC (cyber-crime), CE (cyber-
espionage), H (hacktivism) and CW (cyber-warfare) binary variable are equal to one if they 
match the cyber-attack type and zero otherwise. For all binary variables, we use the added-up 
figures per day as cyber-attacks may happen multiple times within a day. Liq is a liquidity 
measure computed using the stock index of the country hit by a cyber-attack. In the case of 
cyber-attacks targeting multiple countries the average liquidity measure across those countries is 
used. ∆VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index in daily percentage 
change to proxy the uncertainty in the global financial market. Cyber_Sec is the cyber security 
index collected from Bloomberg. We winsorise all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We 
report the mean, median, std (standard deviation), Min (minimum), 25th (25th percentile), 75th 
(75th percentile), Max (maximum) and N (number of observations) of each variable, as well as 
the list of countries with the corresponding market indices included in our sample (Panel F). 
 
Panel A. Cyber-attacks targets and types 
 Gov Ind Fin Crypto CC CE CW H US 
Mean 0.47 0.88 0.19 0.08 2.67 0.40 0.10 0.25 1.31 
Median 0.68 0.98 0.44 0.27 1.84 0.62 0.30 0.52 1.19 
Std. 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25th  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
75th  1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 
Max 3.00 4.00 2.00 1.00 8.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 
N 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157 1157 
 
Panel B. Liquidity, hash rate, global financial market uncertainty and investor protection 
 Liq  ∆VIX Cyber_Sec 
Mean 0.57 0.03% 2.92 
Median 0.25 0.00% 0.55 
25 
 
Std. 0.51 6.42% 2.81 
Min 0.20 -16.85% 2.00 
25th  0.39 -2.91% 2.50 
75th  0.70 1.95% 3.43 
Max 1.42 25.47% 4.04 
N 1149 1157 1157 
 
Panel C. Bitcoin and √Rcovw 
 Bit_R Bit_Mu �Bit_RV Bit_V Bit_RAR �Rcovw 
Mean 0.17% 0.19% 4.58% 17.02 5.12% 3.79% 
Median 0.23% 0.18% 4.53% 17.12 5.14% 3.81% 
Std. 3.67% 0.05% 0.23% 1.74 1.26% 0.39% 
Min -11.30% 0.09% 4.29% 14.04 2.25% 2.54% 
25th  -1.09% 0.15% 4.40% 15.45 4.14% 3.55% 
75th  1.67% 0.24% 4.65% 18.42 6.07% 4.18% 
Max 10.55% 0.32% 5.26% 20.30 8.36% 4.29% 
N 1157 1157 1157 1157 1156 1156 
 
Panel D. Ethereum 
 Eth_R Eth_Mu �Eth_RV Eth_V Eth_RAR 
Mean 0.34% 0.11% 9.83% 14.69 1.65% 
Median -0.05% 0.41% 8.61% 16.30 10.54% 
Std. 6.71% 1.04% 3.12% 3.79 31.99% 
Min -19.34% -5.80% 7.49% 4.19 -228.23% 
25th  -2.87% 0.28% 8.04% 12.63 7.22% 
75th  3.36% 0.56% 10.63% 17.73 14.70% 
Max 19.92% 0.69% 26.61% 19.53 19.54% 
N 1157 1157 1157 1157 1156 
 
Panel E. Litecoin 
 Lit_R Lit_Mu �Lit_RV Lit_V Lit_RAR 
Mean 0.14% 0.12% 9.75% 13.43 3.11% 
Median -0.09% 0.13% 9.27% 14.91 3.16% 
Std. 5.38% 0.11% 1.13% 3.67 2.72% 
Min -15.93% -0.04% 8.49% 3.64 -1.11% 
25th  -2.13% 0.02% 9.03% 10.52 0.58% 
75th  2.14% 0.22% 10.41% 16.32 5.87% 
Max 21.68% 0.33% 12.95% 19.21 8.65% 
N 1157 1157 1157 1157 1156 
 
Panel F: Countries and market indices 
Country Market indices 
Australia S&P/ASX 200 INDEX 
Greece Athex Composite Share Price Index 
Barbados Barbados Exchange Comp 
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Belgium BEL 20 INDEX 
Romania BUCHAREST BET INDEX 
Bahrain BB ALL SHARE INDEX 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia BIRS Index 
Lebanon BLOM STOCK INDEX 
Iran TEHRAN STOCK EXCHANGE 
Hungary BUDAPEST STOCK EXCH INDX 
Panama Bolsa de Panama General 
Colombia COLOMBIA COLCAP INDEX 
Costa Rica BCT Corp Costa Rica Index 
Sri Lanka SRI LANKA COLOMBO ALL SH 
Cambodia Cambodia SE Comp Index 
Cyprus GENERAL MARKET INDEX CSE 
Tanzania Tanzania Share Index 
United Arab Emirates DFM GENERAL INDEX 
Bangladesh DSE Broad Index 
Syrian Arab Republic DSE Weighted Index 
Ecuador ECUINDEX 
Egypt EGX 30 INDEX 
Malaysia FTSE BURSA MAL TOP 100 
Kenya FTSE NSE Kenya 25 
Namibia NAMIBIA OVERALL INDEX 
Italy FTSE MIB INDEX 
Spain IBEX 35 INDEX 
Iceland OMX Iceland All-Share PR 
Russian Federation MOEX Russia Index 
Chile S&P/CLX IPSA (CLP) TR 
Iraq ISX GENERAL INDEX 
South Africa FTSE/JSE AFRICA ALL SHR 
Indonesia JAKARTA COMPOSITE INDEX 
Jordan AMMAN SE GENERAL INDEX 
Pakistan KARACHI 100 INDEX 
Kuwait KWSE All Share 
Malta MALTA STOCK EXCHANGE IND 
Maldives Maldives Stock Exch Indx 
Argentina S&P MERVAL TR ARS 
Mongolia MSE Top 20 Index 
Oman MSM30 Index 
Nigeria NIGERIA STCK EXC ALL SHR 
New Zealand S&P NZX All Index 
Philippines PSEi - PHILIPPINE SE IDX 
Palestine PEX Genral Index 
Puerto Rico GDB PUERTO RICO STOCK IX 
Portugal PSI 20 INDEX 
Rwanda Rwanda St Ex Share Index 
Slovakia SLOVAK SHARE INDEX 
Switzerland SWISS MARKET INDEX 
Fiji SPSE Market Cap Wgt TR 
European Union Euro Stoxx 50 Pr 
Estonia OMX TALLINN OMXT 
Trinidad and Tobago TRINIDAD&TOBAGO CMPOSITE 
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Tunisia Tunis SE TUNINDEX 
Uganda USE LSI Index 
Virgin Islands FTSE 100 INDEX 
Lithuania OMX VILNIUS OMXV 
Vietnam HO CHI MINH STOCK INDEX 
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe All Share Index 
Austria AUSTRIAN TRADED ATX INDX 
Australia S&P/ASX 200 INDEX 
Brazil BRAZIL IBOVESPA INDEX 
Canada S&P/TSX COMPOSITE INDEX 
China CSI 300 INDEX 
Czech Republic PRAGUE STOCK EXCH INDEX 
Germany DAX INDEX 
Denmark OMX COPENHAGEN 20 INDEX 
Finland OMX HELSINKI 25 INDEX 
France CAC 40 INDEX 
Hong Kong HANG SENG INDEX 
Ireland IRISH OVERALL INDEX 
Israel TA-125 Index 
India S&P BSE SENSEX INDEX 
Italy FTSE MIB INDEX 
Japan NIKKEI 225 
Korea (South) KOSPI INDEX 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan KASE Stock Ex 
Luxembourg LUXEMBOURG LuxX INDEX 
Montenegro MONEX INDEX 
Mexico S&P/BMV IPC 
Netherlands AEX-Index 
Norway OBX STOCK INDEX 
Poland WSE WIG INDEX 
Qatar QE Index 
Russian Federation MICEX INDEX 
Saudi Arabia TADAWUL ALL SHARE INDEX 
Sweden OMX STOCKHOLM 30 INDEX 
Singapore Straits Times Index STI 
Thailand STOCK EXCH OF THAI INDEX 
Turkey BIST 100 INDEX 
Taiwan TAIWAN TAIEX INDEX 
Ukraine PFTS Index 
United Kingdom FTSE 100 INDEX 
United States of America DOW JONES INDUS. AVG 








Table 3. Effects of cyber-attacks on cryptocurrencies’ risk-adjusted returns 
The following tables present the pooled OLS regression results using the cryptocurrency’s risk-
adjusted return (Bit_RAR, Eth_RAR, Lit_RAR) as a dependent variable affected by cyber security 
(Cyber_Sec) while having cyber-attack target sectors (Gov, Ind, Fin, Crypto), types (CC, CW, H) 
and US target (US) while controlling for global financial market uncertainty change (∆VIX) and 
country specific stock market liquidity (Liq). We report the F-statistics, adjusted R2 and number 
of observations (N). The standard errors are in the brackets.  ***, ** and * denote significance at 


















































































































































Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.48 0.49 
F-stats 11.1*** 9.55*** 10.41*** 8.60*** 21.35*** 17.91*** 




























Table 4. Effects of cyber-attacks on cryptocurrency’s realised volatility 
 
The following tables present the pooled OLS regression results using the cryptocurrency’s 
realised volatility (Bit_RV, Eth_RV, Lit_RV) as a dependent variable affected by cyber security 
(Cyber_Sec) while having cyber-attack target sectors (Gov, Ind, Fin, Crypto), types (CC, CW, H) 
and US target (US) while controlling for global financial market uncertainty change (∆VIX) and 
country specific stock market liquidity (Liq). We report the F-statistics, adjusted R2 and number 
of observations (N). The standard errors are in the brackets.  ***, ** and * denote significance at 


















































































































































Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.66 0.67 
F-stats 16.29*** 14.28*** 21.28*** 17.57*** 43.63*** 36.67*** 



















Table 5. Effects of cyber-attacks on cryptocurrency’s trading volume 
 
The following tables present the pooled OLS regression results using the cryptocurrency’s 
trading volume (Bit_V, Eth_V, Lit_V) as a dependent variable affected by cyber security 
(Cyber_Sec) while having cyber-attack target sectors (Gov, Ind, Fin, Crypto), types (CC, CW, H) 
and US target (US) while controlling for global financial market uncertainty change (∆VIX) and 
country specific stock market liquidity (Liq). We report the F-statistics, adjusted R2 and number 
of observations (N). The standard errors are in the brackets.  ***, ** and * denote significance at 


















































































































































Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51 0.60 0.61 0.54 0.54 
F-stats 23.52*** 19.48*** 33.76*** 28.32*** 25.92*** 21.47*** 























Table 6. Cryptocurrency exchange sector targeted by cyber-attacks 
The following table presents the pooled OLS regression results showing the determinants of 
cyber-attacks targeting the cryptocurrency exchange (Crypto). The independent variables include 
cyber security (Cyber_Sec), other cyber-attack targets (Gov, Ind, Fin), types (CC, CW, H), 
countries (US) and cryptocurrency’s risk-adjusted return (Bit_RAR, Eth_RAR, Lit_RAR) while 
controlling for global financial market uncertainty change (∆VIX), and country specific stock 
market liquidity (Liq). We report the F-statistics, adjusted R2 and number of observations (N). 



































































































































Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.05 0.06 
F-stats 2.14*** 1.97*** 2.1*** 

















Table 7. Government sector targeted by cyber-attacks 
The following table presents the pooled OLS regression results showing the determinants of 
cyber-attacks targeting the government sector (Gov). The independent variables include cyber 
security (Cyber_Sec), other cyber-attack targets (Crypto, Ind, Fin), types (CC, CW, H), countries 
(US) and cryptocurrency’s risk-adjusted return (Bit_RAR, Eth_RAR, Lit_RAR) while controlling 
for global financial market uncertainty change (∆VIX), and country specific stock market 
liquidity (Liq). We report the F-statistics, adjusted R2 and number of observations (N). The 



































































































































Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.05 0.06 
F-stats 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 


















Table 8. Industry sector targeted by cyber-attacks 
The following table presents the pooled OLS regression results showing the determinants of 
cyber-attacks targeting the industry sector (Ind). The independent variables include cyber 
security (Cyber_Sec), other cyber-attack targets (Crypto, Gov, Fin), types (CC, CW, H), 
countries (US) and cryptocurrency’s risk-adjusted return (Bit_RAR, Eth_RAR, Lit_RAR) while 
controlling for global financial market uncertainty change (∆VIX), and country specific stock 
market liquidity (Liq). We report the F-statistics, adjusted R2 and number of observations (N). 



















































































Lit_RAR   0.467 
(1.138) 
 













































Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.31 0.31 
F-stats 9.1*** 9.11*** 9.07*** 
















Table 9. Financial sector targeted by cyber-attacks 
The following table presents the pooled OLS regression results showing the determinants of 
cyber-attacks targeting the financial sector (Fin). The independent variables include cyber 
security (Cyber_Sec), other cyber-attack targets (Crypto, Gov, Ind), types (CC, CW, H), 
countries (US) and cryptocurrency’s risk-adjusted return (Bit_RAR, Eth_RAR, Lit_RAR) while 
controlling for global financial market uncertainty change (∆VIX), and country specific stock 
market liquidity (Liq). We report the F-statistics, adjusted R2 and number of observations (N). 























































































Lit_RAR   0.166 
(0.576) 
 













































Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.13 0.13 
F-stats 3.77*** 3.73*** 3.74*** 

















































Appendix I. Variance inflation factor (VIF) test 
The following tables show the VIF test results for the regressions from Table 3 to 9. 
 







Gov Gov × 
Cyber
_Sec 
Ind Ind × 
Cyber
_Sec 









CC CE H US Liq VIX 
1.32 1.34 1.26 1.39 1.06 1.55 1.07 1.25 1.10   2.99 1.30 2.54 1.34 1.21 1.06 
1.07               1.17 1.04 
1.32 1.34 1.26 1.39 1.06 1.55 1.07 1.25 1.10   2.99 1.30 1.34 2.54 1.21 1.06 
1.07               1.17 1.04 
1.32 1.34 1.26 1.39 1.06 1.55 1.07 1.25 1.10   2.99 1.30 1.34 2.54 1.21 1.06 
1.07               1.17 1.04 
1.98   1.38 1.07 1.51 1.06 1.24 1.10 1.59 1.87 2.90 1.29 1.35 2.53 1.72 1.06 
2.00 1.34 1.26   1.48 1.07 1.23 1.10 1.59 1.88 2.95 1.16 1.25 2.49 1.72 1.06 
1.98 1.32 1.26 1.33 1.07   1.22 1.10 1.60 1.88 2.59 1.27 1.33 2.49 1.72 1.06 
2.00 1.34 1.26 1.36 1.06 1.51 1.07   1.60 1.87 2.72 1.30 1.34 2.55 1.72 1.06 
 
 







Gov Gov × 
Cyber
_Sec 
Ind Ind × 
Cyber
_Sec 









CC CE H US Liq VIX 
1.32 1.34 1.26 1.39 1.06 1.55 1.07 1.25 1.10   2.99 1.30 2.54 1.34 1.21 1.06 
1.07               1.17 1.04 
1.32 1.34 1.26 1.39 1.06 1.55 1.07 1.25 1.10   2.99 1.30 1.34 2.54 1.21 1.06 
1.07               1.17 1.04 
1.32 1.34 1.26 1.39 1.06 1.55 1.07 1.25 1.10   2.99 1.30 1.34 2.54 1.21 1.06 
1.07               1.17 1.04 
1.90 1.38   1.06 1.52 1.06 1.24 1.10 5.93 6.03 2.90 1.29 1.34 2.53 1.45 1.06 
2.01 1.33 1.38   1.48 1.07 1.22 1.10 5.93 6.03 2.95 1.16 1.24 2.48 1.45 1.06 
1.89 1.31 1.25 1.33 1.06   1.22 1.10 5.94 6.03 2.58 1.27 1.32 2.49 1.44 1.06 












Gov Gov × 
Cyber
_Sec 
Ind Ind × 
Cyber
_Sec 









CC CE H US Liq VIX 
1.32 1.34 1.26 1.39 1.06 1.55 1.07 1.25 1.10   2.99 1.30 2.54 1.34 1.21 1.06 
1.07               1.17 1.04 
1.32 1.34 1.26 1.39 1.06 1.55 1.07 1.25 1.10   2.99 1.30 1.34 2.54 1.21 1.06 
1.07               1.17 1.04 
1.32 1.34 1.26 1.39 1.06 1.55 1.07 1.25 1.10   2.99 1.30 1.34 2.54 1.21 1.06 
1.07               1.17 1.04 
2.07   1.38 1.06 1.51 1.06 1.24 1.10 2.18 1.51 2.89 1.30 1.35 2.53 1.42 1.06 
2.08 1.34 1.26   1.48 1.07 1.23 1.10 2.19 1.52 2.94 1.16 1.26 2.48 1.42 1.06 
2.06 1.32 1.26 1.33 1.06   1.22 1.10 2.20 1.52 2.58 1.27 1.33 2.49 1.42 1.06 




Appendix II. Cyber-attack target country and count 
 
Cyber-attack target country Cyber-attack count 
United States of America 1519 
More than one country 930 




Russian Federation 76 
Australia 65 
Italy 65 












South Africa 21 




Saudi Arabia 17 
Switzerland 16 
New Zealand 16 













































Cocos (Keeling) Islands 2 
Colombia 2 








































Trinidad and Tobago 1 
Tanzania 1 





Appendix III. Visualization of cyber-attacks across the globe 
 
 
